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One of the key challenges of current day electronic procurement systems is to enable procurement decisions transcend
beyond a single attribute such as cost. Consequently, multiattribute procurement have emerged as an important research
direction. In this paper, we develop a multiattribute e-procurement system for procuring large volume of a single item.
Our system is motivated by an industrial procurement scenario for procuring raw material. The procurement scenario
demands multiattribute bids, volume discount cost functions, inclusion of business constraints, and consideration of multi-
ple criteria in bid evaluation. We develop a generic framework for an e-procurement system that meets the above require-
ments. The bid evaluation problem is formulated as a mixed linear integer multiple criteria optimization problem and goal
programming is used as the solution technique. We present a case study for which we illustrate the proposed approach and
a heuristic is proposed to handle the computational complexity arising out of the cost functions used in the bids.
 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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The Internet and Internet-based technologies are impacting businesses in many ways. With the increasing
pressure that companies are experiencing as markets become more global, the Internet continues to play a crit-
ical role to speed up operations and to cut costs. By enabling new business processes, Internet also helps orga-
nizations to react quickly and efficiently in order to keep up with changing market requirements. One such
business process that has gained much attention in recent times is Business-to-Business e-procurement. e-Pro-
curement is an Internet-based business process for obtaining materials and services and managing their inflow
into the organization. Procurement is an important part of the more general supplier selection or vendor0377-2217/$ - see front matter  2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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S. Kameshwaran et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 179 (2007) 518–536 519selection problem [3,48], which is concerned with the selection of candidate suppliers, determining the nature
of contracts with them, and then selecting the best set of suppliers among the alternatives.
Initially, in the past few years, naive use of Internet and information technologies saw complex back-end
applications supporting supply chains of large companies, with simple front-end e-catalog systems supporting
procurement. Recent trends are focusing on user friendly applications that embed sophisticated business logic
and algorithms. This involves identifying, evaluating, negotiating, and configuring optimal groupings of sup-
pliers’ bids, which are received in response to a buying organization’s Request-for-Quote (RFQ). The objective
is usually to minimize the total procurement cost subject to various business constraints. This need is present
during the initial stage of awarding business to suppliers on new products, and is also present when primary
suppliers are unable to deliver supplies (e.g., in the case of a strike, natural disaster, financial default, or other
event that causes a work stoppage) to existing products. Such a procurement process, with suppliers bidding in
response to buyer’s RFQ and the buyer evaluating the bids, borders on the auction mechanism. Auction is a
market mechanism with well-defined set of rules for determining the terms of an exchange of something for
money [36]. Auction mechanisms enable automated negotiation and dynamic pricing, which are not only use-
ful for selling but also in procurement where the buyer is the auctioneer and the sellers are bidders. Numerous
major companies have either used or are in the process of using Internet-based automated auction and nego-
tiation mechanisms for their procurement operations. For example, retailers in footwear, home products and
fashion are using GlobalNetXchange private auction exchange, auto manufacturers are using Covisint’s auc-
tions capabilities, and GE uses its own Global Exchange Services to help procure goods more effectively from
suppliers [17]. There are many published case studies of successful deployment of e-auctions in procurement,
for example, see [16,18,23,30]. For a more general overview of use of auctions in e-procurement see [9].
1.1. Motivation
The complexity of a procurement process depends primarily on the number and the quantity of the items
procured and also the business constraints associated with it. Procuring a single indivisible item is the simplest
form of automated negotiation mechanism used in e-procurement. The suppliers respond to the buyer’s RFQ
with a bid price. The winning supplier is the one who quotes the lowest bid price. Many commercial systems1
are available with no complex or expensive software and can be deployed within hours of identification of a
new procurement opportunity. However, there are certain industrial procurement scenarios which demand
more expressive bids and flexible bid evaluation techniques.
A team of researchers from General Motors Research (which included the last three authors of this paper)
recently used an approach based on procurement auctions and optimization techniques to solve an industrial
procurement problem [9]. This approach, soon to be deployed as a web application within General Motors
Corporation (GM Corp), allows business users to determine an optimal allocation of awards to bids using
the application over the company’s intranet. The procurement corresponds to that of an important raw mate-
rial for automotive manufacturing. The overall commodity sourcing process is shown in Fig. 1. Within GM, a
huge amount of this commodity is sourced every year. To gain maximum cost savings (at a sufficiently high
level of desired quality), GM uses a centralized demand aggregation and reselling application for the whole
supply chain. This application attempts to combine the individual commodity requirements of its processors
and plants, with GM’s direct commodity requirements to create large orders. These larger orders often qualify
for significant volume discounts with the commodity suppliers. GM then resells a portion of the purchased
commodity to its processors to cover their material needs. The overall process is very complex and manual
approaches for determining an allocation of awards to the suppliers require enormous effort.
The requirements for the commodity are aggregated within a centralized system. The tool looks at the cat-
alogs of the approved suppliers and sends RFQs. The suppliers submit configurable bids [6] to the tool in
response to the RFQ. A configurable bid gives either a base price for a bundle and quantity, or a volume dis-
count price, which is a function of quantity. The bid consists of various attributes, with a value specified for
each of these attributes. A supplier can also specify some logical rules for assigning some discounts to specific1 SpeedBuy from http://www.edeal.com; and many solutions from http://www.freemarkets.com.
Fig. 1. A typical procurement process.
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to a plant. Also, there are some restrictions on the number of suppliers that can be selected for a plant and also
on the number of suppliers that can be awarded business. All of these business constraints are determined by
taking into consideration the suppliers’ capacities, their disruption risk, their overhead costs, etc.
The tool evaluates the bids in order to choose the best configuration and feeds them into the optimization
model. The tool outputs a cost effective allocation to the suppliers. The model that the team created to solve
the problem determines an efficient allocation of awards to bids so that overall procurement cost is minimized
subject to the business constraints. A mathematical programming model used to determine the winners of the
procurement auction. It was demonstrated that significant cost savings (as high as 3%) are possible when
applying an auctions and optimization based approach to the above problem. It was also shown that using
this type of modeling approach allows business analysts to explore multiple different constraints on the award
and reallocation process. This leads to a much better understanding of the sensitivity of the optimal sourcing
decisions to business constraints than possible using a more traditional manual process.
However, the system is not generic enough to handle volume discount bids for each of the attributes and is
not flexible to incorporate multiple objectives in bid evaluation. Often there are multiple criteria in bid eval-
uation like maximize on-time delivery, minimize part failure rate, etc., along with the traditional criterion of
minimizing procurement spend. Thus a generic system for a large volume industrial procurement demand
the following requirements: (1) the bidding language should be expressive enough for the suppliers to express
the various attributes of the item (like quality) and the procurement process (like lead time), (2) the supplier
selection decision should be based on various criteria, (3) the process should make best use of the volume dis-
counts offered by the suppliers, and (4) procurement decisions should take into account business constraints of
the buyer and the suppliers.
In this paper, we develop a generic framework for an e-procurement system that meets the above require-
ments, using the state-of-art techniques and the industry best practices. The framework is based on the e-pro-
curement model proposed in [26]. The contributions, along with the outline of this paper can be summarized
as follows. The related literature and the industry best practices are briefly reviewed in Section 2. In Section 3,
the bid evaluation problem that arises in the above multiattribute procurement is modeled as a mixed linear
integer, multiple criteria optimization problem. The structure and complexity of the bid evaluation problem is
studied in Section 4, where it is proved that a simple instance of this problem (with a single attribute and with a
single value for this attribute) is NP-hard. A goal programming approach for solving the bid evaluation
problem is proposed in Section 5. In Section 6 the proposed approach is illustrated with a numerical example
for a procurement scenario with realistic constraints and goals. To tackle the computational complexity
S. Kameshwaran et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 179 (2007) 518–536 521arising out of the use of piecewise linear cost functions, a linear relaxation based heuristic is proposed in Sec-
tion 7. Conclusions are drawn in Section 8 with suggestions for future work.
2. Relevant literature and industry best practices
In this section, we provide a brief summary of the techniques from literature and industry best practices,
relevant to the requirements stated above. Combinatorial auctions [12] have been found successful in indus-
trial procurement of multiple items [18,37]. In this paper, we consider procurement of large volume of a single
item.
2.1. Volume discount bids
The procurement is for multiple units of a single good and the demand needs to be satisfied by procuring
from multiple suppliers. Thus, for each winning supplier, the buyer has to decide the winning quantity. This
dimension allows the suppliers to submit a cost function, instead of a unit price. Quantity discount pricing has
been studied by various researchers with varying assumptions on the price structure and the underlying deci-
sion problem [31,28,14,19,29]. The commonly used cost function is the piecewise linear function defined over
quantity. Procurement auctions with piecewise linear cost curves are common in industry for long-term stra-
tegic sourcing [14] and they have proved to be profitable for the buying organization [23]. e-Procurement auc-
tions with such cost functions have been considered in [19,29,27]. The cost function, depending on the
mathematical representation, leads to a multiple choice knapsack constraint [19,29] or tree knapsack con-
straint [27].
2.2. Multiattribute auctions
In industrial procurement, several aspects of the supplier performance, such as quality, lead time, delivery
probability, etc. have to be addressed, in addition to the qualitative attributes of the procured item. A mul-
tiattribute bid thus has several dimensions and this also allows the suppliers to differentiate themselves, instead
of competing only on cost. Multiattribute auctions deal with trading of items which are defined by multiple
attributes. They are considered to play significant role in the commerce conducted over the WWW [45,4].
Multiattribute auctions as a model for procurement within the supply chain was studied in [10]. It is a one-
shot auction in which the suppliers respond to the scoring function provided by the buyer. Multiattribute auc-
tion for procurement proposed in [8] has two stages: a supplier is chosen in the first stage and the buyer bar-
gains with the chosen supplier in the second stage to adjust the level of quality. The other approach in
designing multiattribute auctions is combining multicriteria decision analysis and single-sided auction mech-
anisms. Multicriteria decision analysis has been used in supplier selection problems [22,3]. Multiattribute auc-
tion based on multiattribute utility theory (MAUT) [41] for e-procurement was proposed in [5]. Multicriteria
decision analysis techniques like MAUT are also used in bid analysis products from Frictionless Commerce
and Moai Technologies.2 The bids submitted by the suppliers are in the form of (attribute, value) pairs.
The buyer assigns weights to the attributes indicating their relative importance and has a scoring function
for each attribute. The scoring functions essentially convert each attribute value to a virtual currency, so that
all attribute values can be combined into a single numerical value that quantifies the bid. The combination rule
generally used is the weighted additive combination [5]. For a more comprehensive study on the design of mul-
tiattribute auctions see [4]. IBM Research’s Absolute decision engine [32] provides buyers, in addition to stan-
dard scoring mechanisms, an interactive visual analysis capability that enable buyers to view, explore, search,
compare, and classify submitted bids. An iterative auction mechanism to support multiattribute procurement
was proposed in [2]. The buyer uses an additive scoring function for non-price attributes and he announces a
scoring rule at the beginning of each round. Through inverse optimization techniques, the buyer learns his
optimal scoring rule from the bids of the suppliers. The mechanism is designed to procure a single indivisible2 http://www.frictionless.com and http://www.moai.com.
Fig. 2. Main elements of a configurable bid.
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additive scoring function to rank the bids. All the above mechanisms solve the incomparability between the
bids, due to multiple attributes, by assigning a single numerical value to each bid and then ranking the bids
by these values. Multicriteria auction proposed in [43] is an iterative auction which allows incomparability
between bids and the sellers increment their bid value by bidding more in at least one attribute. Iterative mul-
tiattribute auctions for procurement was proposed in [39] for procuring a single item. The bid consists of a
price for each attribute and the iterative format provides feedback to the suppliers to update their bid prices.
2.3. Optimization techniques
e-Procurement systems that promise a productive strategic sourcing should take into account various busi-
ness rules and constraints, like exclusion constraints (goods of supplier X cannot be received from location A),
aggregation constraints (for example, at least two and at most five winning suppliers), exposure constraints (for
example, at most forty percent of total business to any supplier), business objective constraints (for example,
overall quality factor must be at least 7), etc. For such systems, optimization techniques can be used where
the business rules are added as side constraints to the optimization problem. The bid evaluation problem is
an optimization problem and it is indeed one of the earliest applications of linear programming [20]. Many
commercial bid analysis products from companies like Emptoris, Rapt, and Mindflow3 also use optimization
techniques like linear programming and constraint programming.
2.4. Configurable bids
In multiattribute auctions, the bids are generally described as sets of attribute–value pairs. To further auto-
mate negotiations on complex goods and services, configurable bids were proposed in [6]. In configurable bids,
bidders can specify multiple values and price mark-ups for each attribute and the buyer can configure the bid
optimally by choosing appropriate values for the attributes. But configurable bids exhibit combinatorial fea-
tures and the total number of possible configurations increases exponentially with the number of attributes
and the number of possible values for each attribute. Hence, enumerating and communicating all possible con-
figurations to the buyer is not a viable alternative. The proposal in [6] is to describe configurable bids by closed3 http://www.emptoris.com, http://www.rapt.com, and http://www.mindflow.com.
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quantity and qualitative attributes. The total price of a configuration is the sum of the prices of the individual
attribute values chosen. The logical constraints between the attribute values are added as linear constraints in
the optimization model to select the best configuration for each bid Fig. 2.
The aim is to develop a generic e-procurement system with the following requirements: (1) the supplier
should be able to bid on multiple attributes, (2) a rich bidding language like configurable bids should be avail-
able to automate negotiations across multiple bids, (3) should support volume discount bids, (4) there should
be flexibility for including business rules and purchasing logic in bid evaluation, and (5) bids should be evalu-
ated using multiple criteria. Current solutions satisfy subsets of these requirements, but no single existing solu-
tion satisfies all of these requirements at the same time. For example, bid optimization and analysis tool
(BOAT) from Perfect4 provides flexibility for incorporating business rules and uses multicriteria decision anal-
ysis technique for handling multiple attributes, but does not allow configurable bids. The multiattribute auc-
tions proposed in [6] and the GM application come closest to satisfying all of these requirements. Our
proposal differs from existing approaches in the following ways: (1) the configurable bids can possibly be piece-
wise linear functions of price on quantity for each value of each attribute, (2) the configurable bids on the mul-
tiple attributes are directly integrated into the bid evaluation, (3) the bid evaluation problem is modeled as a
multiple criteria optimization problem, and (4) goal programming technique is used for bid evaluation.
3. The model
In this section we systematically develop the generic framework for an e-procurement system that meets the
requirements of an industrial procurement scenario briefed above. First we note the design issues that are con-
sidered in this paper.
3.1. Design issues
The procurement process with RFQ and bidding is inherently based on auctions and hence the design prin-
ciples generally follow auction design. Auctions can categorized based on the dynamics as: (1) one-shot or sin-
gle-round auctions and (2) progressive or iterative or multiple-round auctions. One-shot auctions are sealed bid
auctions, which has a single bidding phase, during which all the bidders submit their bids. Progressive auctions
can be sealed bid or open bid, but has multiple rounds of bidding phases. At the end of each bidding phase,
there will be flow of information from the auctioneer to the bidders. This will help the bidders to prepare their
bids for the next bidding phase. The design parameters of one-shot auctions are bidding language, bid evalu-
ation policy, and pricing policy. The bidding language specifies the format of bids, the bid evaluation policy
describes the technique to determine the winners, and the pricing policy determines the price of the winning
goods. On the other hand, design of progressive auctions is relatively non-trivial, which includes the specifi-
cation of bidding language, bid evaluation technique at each bidding round, information exchange at the end
of each round, termination condition, and the pricing policy. However, the progressive auction has many
advantages over its one-shot counterpart [11], especially in procurement [39]. There are many design method-
ologies for progressive auctions [7,38,25] for procurement, even for multiattribute procurement [39]. However,
the extension of the above techniques is not obvious for the procurement scenario considered in this paper. We
design here only the one-shot procurement, which has just one bidding phase.
The procurement process with the RFQ and the bidding, only borders on auctions and are indeed less for-
mally structured than auctions. The auction design is generally based on the principles of mechanism design.
Mechanism design [34] is the sub-field of microeconomics and game theory that considers how to implement
good system-wide solutions to problems that involve multiple self-interested agents, each with private infor-
mation about their preferences. The mechanism design methodology has also been found useful in designing e-
markets [46]. One of the main assumptions in mechanism design is that the rules of the auction is a common
knowledge to all the participating agents. In procurement, though the rules of bid submission are common4 http://www.perfect.com.
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ered in this paper, the purchasing manager may take into account several business rules and purchasing logic
in bid evaluation, which are not generally revealed to the suppliers. Moreover, the criteria and the constraints
can be modified by the buying organization, based on the received bids. Hence, we do not follow the mech-
anism design approach. We consider only the design issues related to bid structure and bid evaluation tech-
nique, from the perspective of the buying organization (auctioneer). We use the pay-as-bid pricing policy
(the suppliers are paid the cost quoted in the bid), which is the commonly used pricing policy in current e-pro-
curement systems. This pricing policy induces strategic behavior in the bid preparation of the suppliers. As the
suppliers have to supply the goods at the quoted cost, they do not reveal their true cost and quote a higher cost
to obtain profit. This is a liability to both the suppliers (in terms of strategic bid preparation) and the buyer (in
terms of less economically efficient trade). The bid preparation problem of the supplier is complimentary to the
auction design problem of the buyer. This is an equally important design issue (which is implicitly taken care
in the mechanism design approach). However, we do not consider this issue in this paper.
Based on the one-shot dynamics, e-procurement system considered in this paper consists of the following
phases: (1) RFQ generation and distribution by the buyer, (2) sealed bid submission by the suppliers during a
predefined bidding interval, and (3) bid evaluation by the buyer (after the expiration of the bidding interval) to
determine the winning bids.
3.2. RFQ generation
The RFQ consists of relevant information such as an identifier, product name, issue date, quote due date,
the buyer information, and the attributes. The set of attributes is denoted by U and Eu is the admissible
domain for each attribute u 2 U.
3.2.1. RFQ notation
½b; b requested quantity range ðb 6 bÞ
U set of attributes
Eu admissible domain of values for attribute u 2 U
u0 2 U is cost attribute
The attributes can consist of product features (like quality), service features (like lead time, warranty, main-
tenance spares), and supplier features (like stock values, manufacturing capacity). We use u0 to denote the
mandatory attribute cost in U. The domain Eu of attribute u can be either discrete (like lead time) or contin-
uous (like on-time delivery probability).
3.3. Bid submission
Configurable bids proposed in [6] allow bidders to specify multiple values for each attribute and mark-up
prices (unit price) for each attribute value. The buyer can configure the product by choosing appropriate attri-
bute values that suit his interests and demand. In this paper we consider configurable bids of the following
nature: for each attribute u, the bid j can specify a set of values Wu  Eu and a piecewise linear price function
Qjuw defined over quantity range ½ajuw; ajuw for each attribute value w 2Wu. In [6], the price function of any
attribute is linear with quantity, whereas we generalize it to piecewise linear. This generalization allows the
bidder to specify piecewise linear cost functions for attributes like lead time (transportation mode), whose cost
may depend on quantity. The linear function is a special case of the piecewise linear function, and hence can
also be used to represent mark-up prices like in [6] for attributes like warranty. Fig. 3 illustrates sample cost
functions for attributes (1) cost (u0) and (2) delivery lead time. For the cost attribute, the supplier submits a
single volume discount bid, whereas for the lead time a piecewise linear cost function for each of the attribute
value is submitted. The different lead times are due to different transportation modes and hence different cost
curves. Depending on the business constraint (with respect to lead time) and budget constraints, the buyer can
configure the bid by choosing different quantity for different lead times.
3 days
5 days
10 days
Quantity
Price
Quantity
Price
Fig. 3. Configurable bids for attributes cost and delivery lead time.
Table 1
Notation for bid j
Wu Set of values for each attribute u 2 U
½ajuw; ajuw Supply quantity range available for attribute u with value w
Qjuw Piecewise linear cost function for attribute u with value w defined over ½ajuw; ajuw
ljuw Number of piecewise linear segments in Qjuw
~djuw Breakpoints at which the slope of Qjuw changes
bsjuw Slope of Qjuw on ð~ds1juw ; ~dsjuwÞ
n0juw Price at ajuw ð¼ ~d0juwÞ
nsjuw Extra fixed cost at the breakpoint s
Qjuw ðð~d0juw; . . . ; ~dljuwjuwÞ; ðb1juw; . . . ; bljuwjuwÞ; ðn0juw; . . . ; nljuwjuwÞÞ
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cost curve for each of the attribute values. The price function Qjuw shown in Fig. 4 is the total price (not the
unit price) at which the bidder is willing to trade as a function of quantity. This piecewise linear cost curve was
used in [27] for procurement auctions and similar functions were used in [19]. The function shown in the figure
can be compactly represented by tuples of break points and slopes ðð~d0juw; . . . ; ~dljuwjuwÞ; ðb1juw; . . . ; bljuwjuwÞ;
ðn0juw; . . . ; nljuwjuwÞÞ where ljuw is the number of linear segments and n0juw is the price at d0juw ¼ ajuw. The break
points ~d0juw ð¼ ajuwÞ; ~d1juw; . . . ; ~dljuwjuw ð¼ ajuwÞ denote the points where the slope changes and the corresponding0 1 2δ δ δ
β 1
juw juw juw
β 2
juw
juw
~ ~ ~
njuw } njuw
{
{
njuw
n
0 1
2
3juw β 3juw
Quantity
Price Qjuw
δ~ juw3
Fig. 4. Piecewise linear price function Qjuw.
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ljuw
juw . The extra fixed costs n
s
juw at the breakpoints s introduce the discontinuities in the func-
tion. The function is assumed to be non-decreasing, but the slopes bsj need not be decreasing as shown in the
figure. The assumed cost structure is generic enough to include various special cases: linear, concave, convex,
continuous, and aj = 0. The cost structure enables the suppliers to express their volume discount or economies
of scales and/or the production and logistics constraints. The set Wu is assumed to be always finite even if the
domain Eu is infinite. For example the attribute delivery probability can have Eu = [0.8,1], but the bidder can
specify only finite possible values, say, Wu = {0.8,0.85,0.9}. The Qjuw shown in Fig. 3 is for only one value w
of attribute u. The bidder can specify such function for each w 2Wu as shown in Fig. 1. If the buyer configures
the bid j with qjuw units for w 2Wu and u 2 U, then the total cost of procurement from bid j isCostj ¼
X
u2U
X
w2W u
QjuwðqjuwÞ. ð1ÞThe implicit assumption in the above cost structure is that the attributes are independent of one another ex-
cept with the quantity procured.
3.4. Bid evaluation
Multiple attributes can be used both in bid definition and bid evaluation. In [2], the attributes are distin-
guished as endogenous (bidder controllable) and exogenous from the bidders’ perspective. Attributes in bid def-
inition (or RFQ) provide a means to specify a complex product or service, whereas in bid evaluation, the buyer
can use multiple attributes to select the winning bidders. Therefore in bid definition, all attributes should be
endogenous for the bidders, whereas in bid evaluation, the buyer can use some exogenous attributes to select
the winners. We will use the words criteria for bid evaluation and attributes for bid definition. The words
criteria and attribute are used interchangeably in the multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) literature.
In MCDM, attributes are defined as descriptors of objective reality which represent values of the decision mak-
ers [49]. We associate the word attribute with the RFQ and bids i.e. the buyer declares in the RFQ various attri-
butes of the goods. We use the word criteria to indicate the objectives defined by the buyer for evaluating the
bids. For example, if the attributes defined in the RFQ are cost, delivery lead time, and delivery probability, and
then the criteria used by the buyer for evaluating the bids can be total cost, delivery lead time, and supplier cred-
ibility. With the above norm established, a criterion for evaluating the bids may consist of zero, one, or many
attributes defined in the RFQ. For example, the criterion that the winning supplier should have high credibility,
is not an attribute defined in the RFQ but a private information known to the buyer. On the other hand, min-
imizing cost of procurement is a function of many attributes defined in the RFQ. Thus criterion is used here in
the sense of an objective. Multicriteria analysis of supplier selection was discussed in [47].
Evaluating the bids by taking into account different factors is an MCDM problem. MCDM has two parts:
multiattribute decision analysis and multiple criteria optimization. Multiattribute decision analysis techniques
like MAUT [41] are often applicable to problems with a small number of alternatives that are to be ordered
according to different attributes. In MAUT, a multiattribute utility function representing the preferences of
the decision maker is elicited and is used to order the set of feasible alternatives. When the decision space
has very large or infinite number of alternatives, the practical possibility of obtaining a reliable representation
of the decision maker’s multiattribute utility function is limited. Multiple criteria optimization [44] techniques
are used in such scenarios where explicit knowledge of the utility function is not available. The bid evaluation
problem of [5,15] to rank the bids was solved by MAUT of multiattribute decision analysis. When configura-
ble bids are used, the problem is not just selecting best bid(s) but selecting the best configuration of bids. In [6],
the bid evaluation problem is done in two stages: first, the best configuration for each bid is chosen using the
scoring function of the buyer and in the second stage, MAUT based techniques are used to rank the bids. With
the nature of configurable bids proposed here, and allowing aggregation of goods across the bids, the number
of alternatives is very large and hence ranking of alternatives using MAUT is not a viable alternative. In multi-
ple criteria decision making situations with large or infinite number of decision alternatives, where the prac-
tical possibility of obtaining a reliable representation of decision maker’s utility function is very limited,
multiple criteria optimization techniques are useful approaches [42]. We model the bid evaluation problem
as a linear integer multiple criteria optimization problem.
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xsjuw 2 ½0; 1 fraction of goods bought from bid j with value w for attribute u with unit cost bsjuw (s = 0, . . . , ljuw)
dsjuw 2 f0; 1g binary variable that assumes value 1 if goods are bought from linear segment s of Qjuw
(s = 1, . . . , ljuw)
XjP 0 amount of goods bought from bid j
zj 2 {0,1} binary variable that selects/rejects bid j
We have not included a binary variable for choosing value w for attribute u of bid j, as this decision is
implied by the binary variable d0juw and x
s
juw is not defined for s = 0 as this refers to the indivisible quantity
ajuw which is again taken care of by d
0
juw.3.4.2. Constraints
We first formulate the constraints in configuring the bids. The amount of goods from bid j with value w for
attribute u has to be chosen considering the price function Qjuw. As shown in Fig. 1, this function can be non-
linear. Using the piecewise linear nature, we can represent them using linear inequalities. Let dsjuw ¼ ~dsjuw  ~ds1juw ,
for s = 1, . . . , ljuw and for all u,w, and j. The quantity range ½ajuw; ajuw is split into ljuw segments, where the
quantity range in segment s is ½0; dsjuw. For the above conversion to make sense, whenever xsjuw > 0, then
ds
0
juw ¼ 1 and xs
0
juw ¼ ds
0
juw for s
0 < s. The following is the set of linear constraints that handle the quantity
selection:d0juw P d
1
juw; ð2Þ
xsjuw 6 dsjuw; s ¼ 1; . . . ; ljuw; ð3Þ
xsjuw P d
sþ1
juw ; s ¼ 1; . . . ; ljuw  1. ð4ÞThe above constraints are for each w 2Wu of every attribute u 2 U of every bid j. The following constraints
handle the consistency and logical relationships among the variables, and the demand requirements:X j 6 zjb 8j; ð5Þ
X
w2W u
d0juwajuw þ
Xljuw
s¼1
dsjuwx
s
juw
 !
¼ X j 8u 2 U 8j; ð6Þ
b 6
X
j
X j 6 b. ð7ÞFor each bid, constraint (5) makes sure that Xj is non-zero only if the bid is a winning bid. For each bid, the
quantity selected should be the same across all the attributes. This is handled by (6). Finally, (7) constrains the
overall procured goods to be within the requested quantity range.
There may be several business rules and purchasing policies like restriction on the number of suppliers,
allowable quantity in a single shipment, homogeneity of attributes [6], etc. Such business rules can be added
as side constraints. Furthermore, there may be interaction effects between the attributes. These are generally
supply side business constraints, where the supplier specifies certain logical restrictions on the allowable com-
bination of the attribute values. The supplier may give special discounts on certain attribute combinations.
These logical constraints are modeled as linear constraints in [6], which can be added with the above set of
constraints.3.4.3. Objectives
Let X denote the vector of decision variables. Then the bid evaluation problem is the following multiple
criteria optimization problem with G linear objectives:
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minfc2X ¼ f2g
..
.
minfcGX ¼ fGg
s.t. X 2 F ;where F is the set of feasible solutions defined by the constraints. Without loss of generality all the objectives
considered are of minimization type. The objectives of the buyer can be like minimize total-cost, minimize lead-
time, maximize on-time delivery probability, etc. For example, the objective of minimizing total cost ismin
X
j
X
u2U
X
w2W u
n0juwd
0
juw þ
Xljuw
s¼1
ðnsjuwdsjuw þ bsjuwdsjuwxsjuwÞ
 !
.4. Structure and complexity
The knowledge of the structure of an optimization problem helps a great deal in designing heuristics and
exact algorithms for solving it. In this section, we investigate the various known structures that arise due to the
constraints and also determine the complexity of the bid evaluation problem.
4.1. Structure
The demand constraint (7) with variables Xj is a set of two knapsack constraints [33,40]: one with the lower
bound b and another with the upper bound b. Once these Xj’s are fixed, then for each bid j, the problem is to
optimally configure the bids by choosing appropriate quantity from each attribute value.Proposition 1. The constraints (2)–(6) are equivalent todsjuw P d
sþ1
juw ; 0 6 s < ljuw 8u 2 U 8j; ð8Þ
X
w2W u
d0juwajuw þ
Xljuw
s¼1
dsjuwd
s
juw
 !
P X j 8u 2 U 8j; ð9Þ
X
w2W u
d0juwajuw þ
Xljuw1
s¼1
dsjuwd
sþ1
juw
 !
6 X j 8u 2 U 8j. ð10ÞProof. ()) Let dsjuw 2 f0; 1g satisfy (3)–(6). If Xj = 0, then the implication is trivial. The constraints (2)–(4)
imply (8). Substituting (3) in (6), we get (9) and likewise substituting (4) in (6) (ignoring s = ljuw), we get
(10). Thus dsjuw that satisfy (3)–(6) also satisfies (8)–(10).
(() Let dsjuw 2 f0; 1g satisfy (8)–(10). Define ejuw = max{s} such that fdsjuw ¼ 1g if d0juw ¼ 1 and ejuw = 1,
otherwise. If zj = 0 and/or d0juw ¼ 0, then the implication is trivial. Let d0juw ¼ 1. Assign xsjuw ¼ dsjuw for s < ejuw
and xsjuw ¼ 0 for s > ejuw. If d0juw ¼ 1, then Xj > 0. Now we need to determine xejuwjuw . Let
X ¼ Xj 
P
w2W uðd0juwajuw þ
Pejuw1
s¼1 x
s
juwd
s
juwÞ. It is easy to see that XP 0. Now determining xejuwjuw is a variant
of the continuous knapsack [33] problem. The X is the demand in the knapsack and xejuwjuw is a continuous
variable in [0,1] with weight dejuwjuw . The continuous knapsack problem can be solved in polynomial time [40].
Thus the dsjuw and the respective x
s
juw satisfy (3)–(6). h
For a fixed Xj, constraints (9) and (10) are knapsack constraints. These constraints with (8) are precedence
knapsack constraints [24]. The piecewise linear function can also be expressed using multiple choice knapsack
constraints as in [19,29].
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From the above discussion, it is highly likely that the bid evaluation problem (with single objective) would
be NP-hard (as knapsack problems are NP-hard [21]). We show here that the problem is NP-hard by
showing that the simple special case of the problem with one attribute with one value, and one linear cost seg-
ment, isNP-hard. We consider the single objective of minimizing cost (which is a mandatory criterion in any
procurement scenario). For this special case, juw  j, l(juw) = 1, zj = dj, and X j ¼ ajdj þ xjðaj  ajÞ. Hence the
decision variables zj and Xj can be ignored. Any algorithm that can solve the original multiattribute and piece-
wise linear cost function problem can also solve this special case. Now we show that the decision version of
this special case isNP-complete upon reduction from 0–1 knapsack problem (thus the single objective opti-
mization versions of the special and generalized case areNP-hard).
Definition 1 (DP). We are given a set of bids J ¼ fð½aj; aj; bj; njÞg from the suppliers, the demand
requirement of the buyer ½b; b, and a goal G. We are asked whether or not there exists J 0  J and assignment
xj 2 [0, 1], such thatb 6
X
j2J 0
aj þ xjðaj  ajÞ 6 b ð11Þand
P
j2J 0nj þ bjðaj  ajÞxj < G.
Definition 2 (KP). We are given a finite set U = {(s(u),v(u))}, B 2Zþ, and a goal ~G. We are asked whether or
not there exists U 0  U, such that Pu2U 0sðuÞP B and Pu2U 0vðuÞ < ~G.
Theorem 1. DP isNP-complete.
Proof. To show that DP is inNP, we observe that specifying a solution is to choose subset J 0 and assign non-
negative values to xj, j 2 J 0. Given such a solution, we can verify whether it meets our requirements in poly-
nomial time. To showNP-hardness, we reduce an arbitrary KP instance to the following DP instance:
• J = U, aj ¼ aj ¼ sðjÞ, nj = 0;
• b ¼ B; b ¼ M (0, arbitrarily large number);
• bj = v(j)/s(j) "j and set goal G ¼ ~G.
It is obvious that the above reduction can be done in polynomial time. Let us show now that the reduction
is valid. Suppose there is a solution to KP instance, i.e. there exists U 0  U such that Pu2U 0sðuÞP B andP
u2U 0vðuÞ < ~G. Choose J 0 = U 0 and xj = 1. This solution satisfies (11) and the goal G. So we have a solution
to the DP instance. Now suppose the DP instance has a solution, i.e. there exist J 0  J and xj 2 [0, 1] such that
(11) is satisfied and
P
j2J 0nj þ bjxjðaj  ajÞ < G. It can be easily verified that U 0 = J 0 is a solution to the KP
instance. Thus the above reduction is valid and hence DP isNP-complete. h
If aj = 0 for all j, then the above special case is a variation of the continuous knapsack problem and can be
solved in polynomial time. If aj > 0, even for some j, then the problem isNP-hard. For this special case, if
b ¼ 1, then the feasible dj can be found in polynomial time using the greedy approach of the knapsack prob-
lem. But for b <1, determining a feasible dj is equivalent to determining feasible solution in an equality con-
strained knapsack problem (assign b ¼ B in the transformation used in the above theorem). This isNP-hard
for equality constrained knapsack problems [40] and hence the problem of finding feasible solutions for our
bid evaluation problems is alsoNP-hard.
5. Bid evaluation using goal programming
Multiple criteria optimization problems can be solved using various techniques like GP, vector maximiza-
tion, and compromise programming [42,44]. We propose the use of GP to solve the bid evaluation problem.
Unlike many multiple criteria optimization techniques which require special software tools, GP can be
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GP, the criteria are given as goals and the technique attempts to simultaneously achieve all the goals as closely
as possible. For example, the cost minimization criterion can be converted to the goal: cost 6 $20,000, where
$20,000 is the target or aspiration level. When the target levels are set for all criteria, GP finds a solution that
simultaneously satisfies all the goals as closely as possible: it is more of a satisficing technique than an optimiz-
ing technique. The goal g can be any of the following types: greater than or equal to (Ptg), less than or equal to
(6tg), equality (=tg), and range ð2 ½tg; tgÞ, where tg’s are the target or aspiration levels. Without loss of gen-
erality let us assume the following goal structure for the procurement problem:goal fc1X ¼ f1g ðf1 P t1Þ
goal fc2X ¼ f2g ðf2 6 t2Þ
goal fc3X ¼ f3g ðf3 ¼ t3Þ
..
.
goal fcGX ¼ fGg ðfG 2 ½tG; tGÞ
s.t. X 2 F .
ð12ÞFor each goal, there will be a deviational variable that measures the deviation from the target level and these
give rise to new goal constraints:c1Xþ cþ1 P t1
c2X c2 6 t2
c3Xþ cþ3  c3 ¼ t3
..
.
cGXþ cþG P tG
cGX cG 6 tG
all c0sP 0.
ð13ÞThe range goal gives rise to two constraints but the other goals lead to only one each. The cþg measures the devi-
ation away from the goal in the positive direction and cg is for the negative direction. The above goal constraints
do not restrict the original feasible region F. In effect, they augment the feasible region by casting F into a higher
dimensional space [44]. The GP techniques vary by the way the deviational variables are used to find the final
solution. We present in this paper the weighted GP technique for solving the bid evaluation problem.
Weighted GP (WGP) or Archimedian GP uses weights, given by the decision maker, to penalize the unde-
sirable deviational variables. The decision maker (in the procurement case, the buyer) specifies the weights jg
for a goal g. The weights measure the relative importance of satisfying the goals. The GP (12) will then be the
following single objective programming problem:min j1c
þ
1 þ j2c2 þ jþ3 cþ3 þ j3 c3 þ    þ jþGcþG þ jGcG
s.t. (13) and X 2 F . ð14ÞThe goals are generally incommensurable (for example, cost minimization is measured in currency whereas
minimizing lead time is measured in days) and the above objective function is meaningless as the weighted
summation includes different units. The most intuitive and simplest way would be to express cg as percentage
rather than as absolute value [42]. For e-procurement, the buyer can specify maximum deviation allowed for a
goal and then use the percentage of deviation in the objective function.
6. A case study
In this section, we present a procurement scenario, with realistic constraints and goals, as a case study to
illustrate the applicability of the proposed model.
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Let a purchasing department be interested in procuring multiple units of raw material or accessories like
power tools, fixtures, dies, machine tools, etc. The department comes up with the following details based
on the requirements.
6.1.1. RFQ
½b; b requested quantity range ðb 6 bÞ
U = {u0,u1,u2} u0 is the cost, u1 is lead time, and u2 is the delivery probability
Eu1 ½w1;w1 weeks
Eu2 [w2,1]
The above RFQ is broadcast to all potential suppliers with a deadline for submission of sealed bids. The
following details are used for bid evaluation, which may or may not be disclosed to the suppliers.
6.1.2. Business constraint
[C1] At least c1% of demand is required within w^1 weeks.
[C2] Do not procure more than c2% of demand from risky suppliers (with delivery probability less than w^2).
6.1.3. Goals
The tg is the target or aspiration level for goal g with t0g as the maximum deviation allowed.
[G1] Total procurement cost 6 t1 ðt01Þ.
[G2] Maximum percentage of business from a supplier is t2 ðt02Þ.
[G3] Number of winning suppliers 2 ½t3; t3 ð½t03; t03Þ.
[G4] At least t4 ðt04)% of demand should be procured from suppliers with delivery probability greater than ~w2.
Some of the above goals could have also been added as business constraints. Though both a goal and a
constraint have the same mathematical structure in the form of inequality, they have different influence on
a solution. A solution should satisfy a constraint whereas it is not necessary to satisfy a goal. In other words,
mandatory conditions are made as constraints and desirable conditions are formulated as goals. The maxi-
mum deviation t0g for a goal is not viewed as a constraint but just as a benchmark to measure the deviation.
After receiving the bids, the bid evaluation is formulated as the following MILP problem. For the sake of
notational clarity in the formulation, the c1; c2; t2; t02; t4, and t
0
4 denote their respective units of demand, instead
of their percentage values.min j1
c1
t01
þ j2
ðPjcj2Þ
t02
þ j3 c

3
t03
þ c
þ
3
t03
 
þ j4 c4t04
ð15Þ
subject to
d0juw P d
1
juw 8w; u; j ð16Þ
xsjuw 6 dsjuw; s ¼ 1; . . . ; ljuw 8w; u; j ð17Þ
xsjuw P d
sþ1
juw ; s ¼ 1; . . . ; ljuw  1 8w; u; j ð18Þ
X j 6 zjb 8j ð19Þ
X
w2W u
d0juwajuw þ
Xljuw
s¼1
xsjuwd
s
juw
 !
¼ X j 8u; j ð20Þ
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X
j
X j 6 b ð21Þ
X
j
X
w6w^1
d0juwajuw þ
Xljuw
s¼1
xsjuwd
s
juw
 !
þ c4 P c1; u ¼ u1 ð22ÞX
j:u26w^2
X j 6 c2 ð23Þ
X
j
X
u2U
X
w2W u
n0juwd
0
juw þ
Xljuw
s¼1
ðnsjuwdsjuw þ bsjuwdsjuwxsjuwÞ
 !
 c1 6 t1 ð24Þ
X j  cj2 6 t2 8j ð25ÞX
j
zj þ c3 P t3 ð26ÞX
j
zj  cþ3 6 t3 ð27ÞX
j:u2>~w2
X j þ c4 P t4 ð28Þ
zj 2 f0; 1g; X j P 0; cP 0; dsjuw 2 f0; 1g; xsjuw 2 ½0; 1:
The constraints (16)–(21) handle the demand constraints, (22) and (23) are for the business constraints, and
(24)–(28) are goal constraints. In the objective function, the deviational variables c are normalized using
the maximum allowed deviations, thus making c dimensional and weighted summation is possible.
6.2. A numerical example
We present in this section a numerical example to illustrate the goal programming approach. The example
problem consisted of 25 randomly generated bids. The price functions in the bids were correlated with decreas-
ing bsjuw over s. The demand of the buyer was chosen with b as 30% of the total supply and b ¼ 1:2	 b. The
number of linear segments for piecewise linear cost curve was randomly chosen between two and five. The
number of attribute values for the lead time were randomly chosen in range [2,6] for each bid and the bs were
chosen to be decreasing with these attribute values. The delivery probability for a bid was chosen uniformly in
range [0.7,1] in denominations of 0.05. The parameters related to the constraints and the goals were fixed as
follows: c1 ¼ 40%; c2 ¼ 25%; w^1 ¼ 2; w^2 ¼ 0:7, and ~w2 ¼ 0:9. With these parameters fixed, the goal param-
eters were varied to generate different problem instances. The goal parameters and the results are shown in
Table 2. The experiment was carried out on a Windows XP based PC equipped with a 2.8GHz Intel P4 pro-
cessor with 1GB RAM. The algorithms were coded in Java, and for the model building and solving of MILP
programs, ILOG Concert Technology of CPLEX 9.0 was used.
The goal values in the Results refer to the values of the solution with respect to the goals. The problem was
first solved as a traditional single objective optimization problem by minimizing the procurement cost. This
provides the buyer with information about the received bids: optimal procurement cost is 2923, number of
winners is 11, maximum percentage of demand from a winning supplier is 12.12%, and 30.3% of demand is
procured with delivery probability greater than 0.9. If the buyer feels that this allocation is not satisfactory
for certain goals, then he can set the goal parameters and solve the problem as multiple criteria optimization.
In the example, the buyer wants the G4 to be 40% and the number of winners to be in range [8,10]. However,
he can pay up to 3000 and can accept 15% of demand from a winning supplier. With the above goal param-
eters set along with the weights and the deviations as given in Table 2 for instance 2, the problem was solved
again. The optimal objective value of zero implies that all goals have been satisfied. With further increasing the
G4 to 55%, the instance 3 was solved and the optimal objective value is 0.006 (the G1 was violated by three
units). The third allocation is preferable to the buyer if he finds the increase in 15% in G4 can compensate the
increase of G1 by three units. Thus the buyer can flexibly change the parameters by observing the outcomes of
the various instances of the problems. Though from the auction perspective, changing of goal levels would be
Table 2
Numerical example
No. Parameters Results
Goal Target Dev. Wt. Obj. G1 G2 G3 G4 Time
1 Minimize procurement cost 2923 2923 12.12 11 30.3 188
2 G1 3000 500 0.4 0 3000 14.54 10 40.60 2515
G2 15% 5% 0.2
G3 8, 10 2, 2 0.2
G4 40% 5% 0.2
3 G1 3000 200 0.4 0.006 3003 14.54 10 57.57 6719
G2 15% 5% 0.2
G3 [8,10] (2,2) 0.2
G4 55% 5% 0.2
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procurement scenarios. This approach is pragmatic in an industrial environment where the buyer can easily set
goals and can compromise or improvise the goal values depending on the received bids. This leads to a much
better understanding of the sensitivity of the optimal sourcing decisions to business constraints than possible
using a more traditional manual process.
7. A heuristic for the bid evaluation problem
The Time in the Table 2 is the computational time in milliseconds taken by the CPLEX to solve the problem
to optimality. Note that the time increases many-fold as the target goal values are made more tight and con-
flicting. The solution time also depends on the structure of the business constraints and the piecewise linear
cost functions. The business constraints can be broadly categorized as intra-bid and inter-bid. Restricting
the business from a winning supplier is a intra-bid constraint, whereas restricting the number of winning sup-
pliers is inter-bid. The requirement of a certain percentage of demand with a certain attribute and the homo-
geneity constraint [6] of choosing a single attribute value for all the winning bidders are also inter-bid
constraints. Inter-bid constraints make the decision variables coupled and interdependent, thus increasing
the solution time when solved by generic solvers. On the other hand, the piecewise linear cost functions con-
tribute to the solution time due to the number of binary decision variables. Commercial optimization packages
use branching algorithms and with large number of binary variables, the solution times likely tends to
increase. In the following we propose a linear programming (LP) relaxation based heuristic to tame the com-
plexity arising out of the piecewise linear cost functions.
Many of the binary variables in the formulation are due to the piecewise linear cost function. Hence by
substituting this function with an approximating function, which has less number of binary variables, can
make the problem easier to solve. However, the solution obtained may not be optimal with respect to the ori-
ginal function. To reduce the optimality gap, one has to choose a tight approximating function. The linear
function that joins the end points is an approximating function, but the optimality gap in generally large
for such a linear approximation. We use the convex envelope as the approximating function. Convex envelope
is the best convex function that underestimates the original function. The choice of convex envelope as the
approximating function is twofold: (1) it provides good lower bound approximation and (2) it can be directly
used with the original formulation by just relaxing the binary variables. It was shown in [13], that the linear
relaxation of the piecewise linear function solves the convex envelope of that function. Though it is possible to
construct the convex envelope of a piecewise linear function in polynomial time, linear relaxation allows to
directly use the mathematical formulation with minimal modifications.
The piecewise linear cost function Qjuw for attribute value w of attribute u for bid j is handled by decision
variables dsjuw (binary) and x
s
juw (linear) through the constraints (2)–(4). We construct the convex envelope of
Qjuw by relaxing the binary variables d
s
juw for s > 0. Note that d
0
juw is not relaxed to avoid violation on the sup-
ply lower bound ajuw. It is worth noting that this relaxation makes the relaxed binary variables redundant as
Table 3
Performance of the heuristic for the bid evaluation problem with 25 bids
Attributes Time (milliseconds) Optimality gap (%)
1 172.7 3.16
2 3388.45 3.50
3 24,711.55 3.60
4 318,099.85 4.15
5 1,858,087.7 4.21
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and s = 1, . . . , ljuw. This further reduces the number of decision variables in the problem. The optimal solution
to the above relaxed problem gives a feasible solution to the original problem and the objective value is a lower
bound. The original value of the feasible solution is just found by substituting the original cost with the convex
cost, thus giving an upper bound.
The experiments were conducted for the bid evaluation problem with the single objective of total cost min-
imization. Each attribute had three attribute values (three piecewise linear cost functions), in addition to the
mandatory cost attribute. The business constraints considered were the restriction on the maximum business
from a winning supplier, bounds on number of winning suppliers, and minimum demand for each of the attri-
bute values. The experiments were directly conducted with the relaxed versions to investigate the solution time
and the worst case optimality gap. Table 3 shows the results of the experiments with 25 randomly generated
bids for different number of attributes. The values are average values computed over 50 problem instances.
There is a steep rise in the computational time with the number of attributes. The optimality gap is the worst
case optimality gap, as it is measured against the objective value of the relaxed problem and not against the
original problem. Our various other experiments by solving the problem with the original piecewise cost func-
tions showed that the optimality gap was less than one percent. However, the solution time were unpredictable
and the CPLEX ran out of memory even for problem instances of 25 bids with 10 attributes. It should be
noted that the constraints (6) for each of the attributes of every bid strongly couples the decision variables.
The proposed heuristic is thus effective in taming the complexity arising out of the piecewise linear cost func-
tions with a marginal loss of optimality.8. Conclusions and future work
In this paper we proposed a framework for a generic e-procurement system with the following properties:
(1) allowing the bidders to bid on multiple attributes, (2) a rich bidding language to automate negotiations
across multiple bids, (3) submission of volume discount bids, (4) flexibility for allowing business rules and pur-
chasing logic in bid evaluation, and (5) bid evaluation using multiple criteria. To develop the above proposal
into an automated e-procurement system, the following issues need to be addressed: (a) user interface for the
bidders to express the piecewise linear cost functions and supply side business constraints, and for the buyer to
express the goals and demand side business constraints, (b) design of XML schema for compact representation
of the configurable bids, goals and business constraints, and (c) automatic generation of linear and logical con-
straints for the bid evaluation problem based on the business constraints. Further, conducting laboratory
experiments will help in identifying the key issues in bid formats, constraint structures, and goal parameters.
Goal programming was proposed as the solution technique for solving the multiple criteria bid evaluation
problem. A numerical example illustrated the flexibility of weighted GP and its effectiveness in obtaining a
satisificing solution with respect to various goals. Another prospective research direction is exploring the pos-
sibilities of using other multicriteria optimization techniques and other GP techniques for bid evaluation. The
interactive sequential GP (ISGP) [35] is a potential candidate which combines and extends the attractive fea-
tures of both GP and interactive solution approaches. It is based on the implicit assumption that the decision
maker can adjust the desired goals through an iterative learning process based on information in a set of solu-
tions. This would enable the buyer to change the aspiration levels of the goal by learning from the bids, similar
to the way the buyer learns his scoring rule from the bids in [2].
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eric commercial solvers like CPLEX even for small instances. We proposed a LP relaxation based heuristic to
handle the complexity arising out of piecewise linear cost functions. One interesting research direction in algo-
rithmic and mathematical programming perspective is to design algorithms to handle the inter bid business
constraints. By exploiting the structure of the constraints and the problem, one could possibly design decom-
position algorithms that decouples the decision variables. Such algorithms can possibly have less computa-
tional time than the generic branch and bound solvers.
The paper was focused entirely on the perspective of the buying organization. For a successful implemen-
tation of an e-procurement system, one also should take into account the participation of the suppliers. The
bid preparation problem faced by the supplier is an important decision making problem and the development
of decision support systems for bid preparation in another important research problem.
The proposed procurement dynamics borders on the auction dynamics and hence auction theory can con-
tribute significantly in improving the procurement process. Auction literature provides two fundamental pre-
scriptions for designing efficient auctions [1]: (1) to implement Vickrey–Clarke–Grooves (VCG) pricing
scheme and (2) to make the auction dynamics open and progressive so that the bidder has sufficient informa-
tion at the time of bidding. In VCG pricing scheme, the payment is such that the bidders payoff equals their
marginal contribution. It provides the bidders with incentive to quote their true values and the allocation is
economically efficient. This inherently solves the bid preparation problem, as the bidders just needs to report
their costs. For the pay-as-bid pricing scheme used in this paper (which is also commonly used in current sys-
tems), the bidders have to strategically misreport their costs to gain profit, which is a liability to both the bid-
ders and the auctioneer. The general framework for designing auctions that meets both the above objectives is
presented in [7]. It is based on duality theory and the primal–dual algorithm when applied to the bid evalu-
ation problem helps in designing a progressive auction. However, the extension of the above framework to
include the business constraints of the procurement and the multiple objectives is non-obvious. It is worth
investigating the issues involved in making the procurement dynamics open and progressive.
The paper has discussed the procurement of multiple units of a single good with multiple attributes. Pro-
curing bundles (that is, multiple items) with multiple attributes is a natural but complex generalization of this
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